An old family shipowner doubling its fleet — in a cycle that has only just begun to turn
Jinhui is a Hong Kong-based dry bulk shipowner, listed on Oslo Børs and controlled by its founding family for decades. The fleet today counts 16 ships — 2 Capesize, 1 Panamax/Kamsarmax and 13 Ultramax/Supramax, with an average age of just under 15 years — plus 14 newbuildings on order for delivery through 2030. The orderbook is almost as large as the fleet itself: 14 newbuildings against 16 ships today. If they are delivered as planned, Jinhui will have 29 ships in 2030 — almost a doubling of tonnage, and with an average age far below today’s just under 15 years. The orderbook is almost as large as the fleet itself: 14 newbuildings against 16 ships today. If they are delivered as planned, Jinhui will have 29 ships in 2030 — almost a doubling of tonnage, and with an average age far below today’s just under 15 years. The fleet went from 17 to 16 ships with the sale of JIN XING (14 Oct 2026), at a price that confirmed a significant uplift to the ship’s book value. The company’s history is cyclically extreme: a profit of US$194m in 2021 followed by a loss of US$55m in 2023. That volatility is at the very core of both the risks and the opportunities in the stock today.
6 reasons to take Jinhui seriously as an investment case
The sections below expand on each point with figures and charts. Boiled down to the essentials, this is the heart of the matter:
You pay 20 cents for every dollar of book value
A P/B of 0.20× is not just cheap for the sector — it is less than a fifth of Star Bulk’s 1.25× and less than a quarter of even the cheapest peer (Safe Bulkers, 0.92×). At that price, a fleet, a listed equity portfolio and cash all come with the deal. If Jinhui were priced like the cheapest of them, its book value would imply a share price of ≈NOK 31 — versus NOK 6.62 today.
Hidden asset value — now with a receipt proving it is real
The fleet’s value is estimated at ≈US$70.9m (+25%) above book value. This is not just an estimate on paper: the sale of JIN XING in October 2026 for US$14.6m — almost twice the ship’s book value — is a concrete data point suggesting the rest of the fleet is undervalued rather than overvalued.
Earnings have turned sharply — the share price has not followed
EPS is expected at NOK 3.98 in FY2026 — almost four times the 2025 level (NOK 1.08) — driven by both a stronger freight market and gains on ship sales. Yet the stock trades at a P/E of only 1.7× on the 2026 estimate, while the closest peers trade at 7-11.5× their expected earnings. If Jinhui were priced like the cheapest of them (Star Bulk, 7.1×), 2026 earnings would imply a share price of ≈NOK 28 — versus NOK 6.62 today. The full quarterly income statement can be found under the tab Income statement →
Cheap fleet growth, locked in before prices rose
14 newbuildings have been contracted at prices mostly in line with or below the market, in a window where Chinese shipyards’ capacity is now booked through 2028-2029. The fleet grows from 16 to 29 ships by the end of 2030 — an expansion that competitors who have not already ordered cannot copy at the same price today.
Lower leverage than most peers
Net debt/equity of 14%, versus 19-42% at Star Bulk, Genco and Safe Bulkers, provides a financial cushion to ride out a downturn in the freight market — and capital in reserve to seize the upswing when the cycle turns for real.
A concrete dividend increase could close part of the discount
Much of the discount is about governance and liquidity, not just the freight market — see the risk section below. But a higher cash dividend in step with improved earnings is harder for the market to dismiss than an accounting revaluation argument, and would be the most direct proof that shareholders also share in the improvement.
This is a summary of the analysis below, not a stand-alone conclusion — see section 03 in particular for the risks that counterbalance the case above.
Financial history and forecast, 2021-2027
Revenue, EBITDA and net profit for 2021-2027
Revenue has ranged between US$82m and US$159m a year since 2021, averaging ≈US$138.5m. EBITDA has swung from US$215m in 2021 to a loss of US$11.8m in 2023 and is expected to land at US$93.7m in 2026. Net profit has followed the same wave: US$194m in 2021, a loss of US$55m in 2023, and an expected profit of US$45.4m in 2026.
This corresponds to average earnings per share (EPS) for 2021-2026 of ≈NOK 3.13 a year, or an average P/E of ≈2.1× (at today’s price, NOK 6.62).
| Year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026E | 2027E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EPS, NOK | 16.66 | −0.61 | −4.72 | 2.06 | 1.08 | 3.98 | 0.99-3.19 |
| Dividend, NOK | 0.94 | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.28 | 0.17 | ≈0.63 | ≈0.16-0.51 |
Earnings per share peaked at NOK 16.66 in 2021, fell to losses in 2022 and 2023, and have since recovered to NOK 2.06 in 2024, NOK 1.08 in 2025 and an expected NOK 3.98 in 2026. Over the same period, the dividend has ranged between NOK 0 (2023) and NOK 0.94 (2021), averaging ≈NOK 0.45 a year.
In total, ≈14.5% of earnings in 2021-2026 has been paid out as dividends. The payout ratio was just under 6% in 2021 and has since been 14-16% in the years the company made a profit (2024-2026).
Net asset value per share, 2021-2026
| Year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 30 Jun 2026 | Revalued |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NAV, NOK | 37.9 | 36.0 | 30.7 | 32.6 | 33.3 | 33.6 | 39.8 |
| Share price, NOK | 11.05 | 7.70 | 5.74 | 6.00 | 5.86 | 6.04 | 6.62 |
| P/B | 0.29× | 0.21× | 0.19× | 0.18× | 0.18× | 0.18× | 0.17× |
Book NAV per share fell from NOK 37.9 at the end of 2021 to NOK 30.7 in 2023, when fleet impairments and losses pulled equity down. It has since risen three years in a row to NOK 33.6 as of 30 June 2026 — up ≈10% from the 2023 low.
Over the same period, the share price fell from NOK 11.05 to NOK 6.04, so P/B has gone from 0.29× in 2021 to 0.18× as of 30 June 2026. Even though NAV has risen every year since 2023, P/B has stayed around 0.18× — at today’s price of NOK 6.62, P/B is ≈0.20×. By comparison, Star Bulk trades at 1.25×, Genco at 1.20× and Safe Bulkers at 0.92× book value. If Jinhui were priced like the cheapest of them, that would imply a share price of ≈NOK 31.
NAV significantly higher than book value
The fleet’s value is estimated at ≈US$70.9m (+25%) above book value. This is not just an estimate on paper: the sale of JIN XING in October 2026 for US$14.6m — almost twice the ship’s book value — is a concrete data point suggesting the rest of the fleet is undervalued rather than overvalued. Including the surplus value, NAV is ≈NOK 39.8 per share and P/B ≈0.17×. The estimated market value of each individual ship can be found under the tab Fleet →
Earnings and P/E 2026E compared with dry bulk peers
Earnings per share are expected to rise from NOK 1.08 in 2025 to NOK 3.98 in 2026 — almost a fourfold increase. Yet the stock trades at a P/E of only 1.7× on the 2026 estimate, while the four closest dry bulk peers trade at between 7× and 11.5× their expected earnings.
If Jinhui were priced like the cheapest of them (Star Bulk, 7.1×), 2026 earnings would imply a share price of ≈NOK 28. The full quarterly income statement can be found under the tab Income statement →
Fleet development and order book, 2026-2030
| Contracted | Ships | Shipyard | Price per ship | Delivery |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | JIN HAN, JIN MING | Jiangsu Hantong | US$34.0m | 2026-2027 |
| 2025 | JIN YAO, JIN FU, JIN FENG, JIN SHENG | Jiangmen Nanyang | US$33.0m | 2028 |
| Feb 2026 | JIN LANG, JIN YU | New Dayang | US$34.0m | May/Jul 2029 |
| Jun 2026 | JIN SHUN, JIN TONG | Jiangmen Nanyang | US$34.15m | 2030 |
| Jun 2026 | JIN GANG, JIN JI | Sumec/New Dayang | US$34.0m | 2030 |
| Sep 2026 | 2 Ultramax | Jiangmen Nanyang | US$35.7m | 2029 |
| Total | 14 newbuildings | ⌀ US$34.0m | 2026-2030 |
Jinhui has 14 newbuildings on order — all modern, fuel-efficient Ultramax ships, contracted at an average of ≈US$34m per ship. Most were ordered in 2024-2026, before shipyard order books filled up towards 2029, and at prices in line with or below the market for comparable Chinese tonnage.
Once the ships are delivered, the company will have 29 owned ships and a much younger fleet. The full fleet development can be found under the tab Fleet →
Leverage compared with dry bulk peers
Jinhui’s net interest-bearing debt is only 14% of equity (US$54.7m versus US$383.6m as of 30 June 2026). That is lower than Star Bulk (19%), Genco (28%) and Safe Bulkers (42%) — only Pacific Basin, which has net cash, is stronger.
The low debt leaves room to finance the order book and to withstand a downturn in the freight market. The full balance sheet can be found under the tab Balance sheet →
Dividends compared with dry bulk peers
| Company | Dividend policy | Frequency |
|---|---|---|
| Star Bulk Carriers | 100% of quarterly free cash flow | Quarterly |
| Genco Shipping | 100% of operating cash flow less a reserve | Quarterly |
| Pacific Basin | At least 50% of net profit | Semi-annual |
| Safe Bulkers | Discretionary, fixed quarterly dividend | Quarterly |
| Jinhui | ≈14.5% of earnings (2021-2026) | Annual |
| Payout ratio of 2026 earnings | Dividend per share | Dividend yield at NOK 6.62 |
|---|---|---|
| 16% (as in 2025) | NOK 0.63 | 9.5% |
| 30% | NOK 1.19 | 18% |
| 50% (Pacific Basin’s floor) | NOK 1.99 | 30% |
Jinhui paid out ≈14.5% of earnings in 2021-2026 — far below peers, where Star Bulk and Genco pay out virtually all of their cash flow and Pacific Basin at least half of its earnings.
The low payout ratio is a deliberate choice: Jinhui has prioritised renewing and expanding the fleet over distributions. Since 2024 the company has ordered 14 newbuildings for a total of ≈US$476m, while total dividends in 2021-2025 came to ≈US$24m. As the order book is delivered and paid for, room is freed up for a larger share of earnings to go to shareholders.
Even at the same payout ratio as in 2025, expected 2026 earnings give a dividend yield of ≈9.5% at today’s price. If the payout ratio is raised to 50%, that equals ≈NOK 1.99 per share — or ≈30% of the share price.
What could make the case wrong
The pitch above is not the whole picture. Here are the five most important reasons why the discount could be justified, however cheap the stock looks on paper:
RISKS
- Ownership structureA family-controlled structure, low trading volume and limited analyst coverage may keep the low valuation in place regardless of fundamental improvements. On the other hand, the Ng family itself owns the majority of the shares — through the parent company Jinhui Holdings, which owns 55.7%, and ≈8% directly — and therefore has no incentive for the share price to fall: the family’s own wealth follows the share price.
- LiquidityA low free float makes the stock hard to sell in larger blocks, especially in downturns — and at the same time attracts short-term day trading that amplifies the swings.
- Earnings volatilityThe impairment/reversal cycle can just as easily swing the other way (-US$49m in 2022) as deliver a revaluation gain — the same volatility that lies behind the revaluation potential in the pitch above can also work against the case.
- The freight market has turned down againAfter a strong rally over the summer of 2026, the Baltic Dry Index and Capesize rates showed a marked, multi-day pullback through late September and early October — a reminder of how quickly the cyclical upswing can turn.
- Cost pressureThe bunker fuel price (VLSFO Singapore) is up ~98% year-to-date following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz — a risk to vessel operating costs that has not yet been fully mapped.